The Sound of Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng. Edited by Sallie B. King and Paul O. Ingram. Curzon Press, Richmond 1999. xxxii, 276 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0-7007-1121-X.

Fuzzy logics are many-valued logics that are well suited to reasoning in the context of vagueness. They provide the basis for the wider field of Fuzzy Logic, encompassing diverse areas such as fuzzy control, fuzzy databases, and fuzzy mathematics. This book provides an accessible and up-to-date introduction to this fast-growing and increasingly popular area. It focuses in particular on the development and applications of "proof-theoretic" presentations of fuzzy logics; the result of more than ten years of intensive work by researchers (...) in the area, including the authors. In addition to providing alternative elegant presentations of fuzzy logics, proof-theoretic methods are useful for addressing theoretical problems and developing efficient deduction and decision algorithms. Proof-theoretic presentations also place fuzzy logics in the broader landscape of non-classical logics, revealing deep relations with other logics studied in Computer Science, Mathematics, and Philosophy. The book builds methodically from the semantic origins of fuzzy logics to proof-theoretic presentations such as Hilbert and Gentzen systems, introducing both theoretical and practical applications of these presentations. (shrink)

The idea that we should simply live in the moment, and should not concern ourselves about the future or the past, has long been a staple of popular philosophy. In this paper, I first attempt to clarify the doctrine and then examine the case for accepting it. My conclusions are, first, that a number of its implications seem quite unpalatable; second, that the main advantages that living in the moment are said to yield are greatly overstated; and, third, that to (...) live by any version of the doctrine that was not highly watered down would be to sacrifice much of what gives meaning to our lives. (shrink)

With theories of political obligation based on consent now generally discredited because most people have not actually consented, certain theorists attempt to rescue consent by proposing mechanisms through which individuals could consent to government. Various mechanisms are examined, including ‘consent-or-leave’ and Michael Walzer's proposal that citizens who refuse to consent be allowed a lesser status, analogous to that of ‘resident aliens at home’. All these mechanisms confront insuperable difficulties concerning essential public goods. Because resident aliens at home will continue to (...) receive public goods, the alternatives are that they be allowed to receive them cost-free or that they incur obligations, even though they explicitly refused to consent. (shrink)

In Polo’s anthropology, the personal transcendentals constitute the first act of the human being. To achieve an understanding of the contribution to the natural growth of the person of human actions performed in space and time, it is required to investigate how the intensity of this act can increase naturally in the context of the doctrine of act and potency. Review of the constitution of human beings in Aristotle, Aquinas and Polo and the real distinction between their ontological components, together (...) with the concept of instrumental causality served to propose an explanation of the natural growth of the person. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band ist die schriftliche Fassung einer Vorlesung, die Moore im Wintersemester 1910/11 an der Cambridge University als Einführung in die Philosophie gehalten hat und erst 1956, zwei Jahre vor seinem Tod, veröffentlicht wurde. Nach einer ausführlichen Erklärung dessen, was Philosophie überhaupt ist, was der Gegenstand und die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, führt Moore im Ausgang von unseren sinnlichen Erfahrungen in das Gesamtgebiet der Philosophie ein. Behandelt werden Themen wie Existenz, materielle Dinge, Dinge in Raum und Zeit, Propositionen, Wissen (...) und Erkennen, die Philosophie David Humes und weitere Themen. Der vorliegende Band ist sowohl für Philosophiestudenten und interessierte Laien zur Einführung in die Philosophie gut geeignet, als auch für den philosophischen Experten, der sich eingehender mit Moores Philosophie beschäftigen möchte. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a framework that supports both free will and anomalous mind-matter interaction (psychokinesis). I begin by considering the argument by the physicist Sean Carroll that the laws of physics as we understand them rule out psychokinesis (and other modes of psi). I find Carroll’s claims problematic, in part due to what I believe are misunderstandings of arguments borrowed from David Hume. I proceed to consider a more dispositional notion of causality (in contrast to one characterized by (...) universal and necessary laws) which I argue is more hospitable to both psychokinesis and free will. I then incorporate recent work from the philosophy of mind and science to arrive at a framework that supports both real volition and psychokinesis, which I argue are intimately linked. This approach is fundamentally dispositional, but grounded in an ontologically prior field of awareness and potentiality. I also consider that the regularities (or causal natures) we observe in our physical world are ultimately supported by what we might term teleological “intentions” within a nonlocal, mind-like quantum ground. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Without question, Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism: Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne, is Daniel Dombrowski's most important and well-argued treatise to date within his growing, prolific literary corpus. Bringing his expertise on John Rawls's political thought to bear on the process thinking of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he explores commonalities of approach and ventures the interpretive hypothesis that Rawls is, at least broadly speaking, a process philosopher. He also argues that each of these philosophers appropriately shares the appellation “political liberal” (...) when that term is carefully defined. I find this strongly plausible. (shrink)

Pozzi provides a thought-provoking account of how machine-learning clinical prediction models (such as Prediction Drug Monitoring Programmes (PDMPs)) may exacerbate testimonial injustice.1 In this response, I generalise Pozzi’s concerns about PDMPs to traditional models of clinical practice and question the claim that inaccurate clinicians are necessarily preferential to inaccurate machine-learning models. I then explore Pozzi’s concern that such models may deprive patients of a right to ‘convey information’. I suggest that machine-learning tools may be used to enhance, rather than frustrate, (...) this right, through the perspective of hermeneutical justice. Pozzi objects to the introduction of machine-learning risk prediction tools in clinical care, due to their being ‘epistemically opaque’, often inaccurate, and a threat to patients’ testimonial justice. Through the example of psychiatry, I suggest this stance idealises traditional models of clinical practice. I propose that clinicians’ judgements are often equally vulnerable to opaque subjectivity, bias and epistemic injustice. For instance, the use of clinical observation or collateral interviewing might be conceptualised as a threat to testimonial justice, by neglecting patients’ own perspectives or voices. In practice, clinical risk prediction often follows inconsistent and somewhat subjective clinical heuristics, which are difficult to summarise or evaluate. Further, although Pozzi diminishes machine-learning …. (shrink)

Habermas’ theory of popular sovereignty has received comparatively little sustained critical attention in the Anglo-American literature since initial responses to Between Facts and Norms. In light of subsequent work on group agency, this paper argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty—in its denial of the normative force of collective citizen action—is best understood as a renunciation of the doctrine. The paper is structured in three sections. Section 1 examines Habermas’ treatment of popular sovereignty prior to Between Facts and Norms as (...) both (i) a principle of constitutional legitimacy or normative justification for the modern Rechtsstaat and (ii) a concept of legitimation for the rule of the ascendant liberal bourgeoisie. Section 2 then argues that Habermas’ reconstruction of popular sovereignty in Between Facts and Norms, by discounting the role of collective citizen agency in the justification of the modern constitutional state, empties the doctrine of its core normative content. The final section briefly elaborates on this claim by reference to Habermas’ theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

Despite regulatory reforms aimed at inhibiting aggressive financial reporting, earnings management persists and continues to concern practitioners, regulators, and standard setters. To provide insight into this practice and how to mitigate it, we conduct an experiment to examine the impact of two independent variables on CFOs’ discretionary expense accruals. One independent variable, incentive conflict, is manipulated at two levels —i.e., the presence or absence of a personal financial incentive that conflicts with a corporate financial incentive. The other independent variable is (...) CFOs’ earnings management ethics, measured as their assessment of the ethicalness of key earnings management motivations. We find that incentive conflict and EM-Ethics interact to determine CFOs’ discretionary accruals such that in the presence of incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the personal incentive by booking higher expense accruals; and in the absence of an incentive conflict, CFOs with low EM-Ethics tend to give into the corporate incentive by booking lower expense accruals. We also find support for a mediated-moderation model in which CFOs’ level of EM-Ethics influences their moral disengagement tendencies which, in turn, differentially affect their discretionary accruals, depending on the presence or absence of incentive conflict. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

_African-American Philosophers_ brings into conversation seventeen of the foremost thinkers of color to discuss issues such as Black existentialism, racism, Black women philosophers within the academy, affirmative action and the conceptual parameters of African-American philosophy.

Studies of Aristotle’s syllogistic system, since Corcoran’s deductionist interpretation supplanted Łukasiewicz’ axiomaticist interpretation, misrepresent Aristotle’s logic in two important respects. Following Corcoran, they take indirect deduction to occur only once in a deduction discourse; they then obviate the system having a reductio rule. Second, they represent reduction as a deductive process for deriving ‘imperfect’ syllogisms from ‘perfect’ syllogisms to impose an axiomatic interpretation on the logic. Denying that Aristotle's logic admits of a reductio rule results from this misrepresentation of reduction. (...) This discussion shows that the defects imputed to Aristotle's logic, and systems devised to resolve them, result from misunderstanding reduction, which itself results from misapprehending Prior Analytics expressly to identify in a metadiscourse deduction rules and not deductions per se. (shrink)

Defences of racial anti-realism typically proceed by establishing that nothing possesses the descriptive characteristics associated with the term ‘race’. This leaves them vulnerable to the externalist challenge that the descriptive meaning of ‘race’ is subject to revision based on discoveries about the nature of its referent. That referent is, according to constructionist realists, the groups we call races (the R-groups). Anti-realists and constructionist realists agree that the R-groups are constructed as real social groups by being viewed and treated as though (...) they were relatively homogenous groups, differing in significant, inherent, heritable ways. Only, anti-realists insist they are not races, but racialized groups. I seek to harness their agreement about the socially constructed nature of the R-groups to break the impasse between anti-realists and constructionist realists and settle their dispute in the anti-realist position's favour. On the account of their social construction agreed by both sides, R-groups exhibit empty concept dependency: they depend for their existence on people's utilizing a concept with no referent. Race cannot be both the concept which captures the R-groups’ nature and the empty concept on whose utilization their existence depends. When we are forced to choose, I argue, the latter is the only justifiable option. (shrink)

This paper examines Laura Valentini’s attempt to explain political obligations through her account of social norms, her ‘Agency-Respect View’ (ARV). A great strength of ARV is preserving the ‘content-independence’ of political obligations. However, ARV does not mesh well with the moral phenomenology of political obligations. ARV is able to generate moral requirements that are strikingly weak. Accounting for the far stronger moral force of requirements to obey the law requires appealing to law-independent considerations. Valentini’s account of these factors suggests greater (...) explanatory force of an alternative view she dismisses, to which she refers as the ‘deflationary view.’ In addition, among alternative theories that Valentini rejects is one based on the principle of fair play. I respond to Valentini’s criticisms, thereby demonstrating the continuing applicability of fair play. (shrink)

As the pagan classical world was subsumed into Christianity sexually hyperactive gods and goddesses transmuted into saints, their former statues that glorified the perfection of their bodies smashed into pieces and reimagined as austere two-dimensional icons to be worshipped by the new faithful. That dualistic and polemic narrative, where the soul’s purpose was to annihilate the body, survives today in the distinction between software and hardware, algorithms and robots, the former as the “ghosts” that animate the empty vessels, the “machines”. (...) But how does this narrative impact our cultural and social fantasies in the twenty-first century as we accelerate toward coexisting, uniting, or merging with intelligent artifacts? How does “humanness” blur when it is claimed by no-biological human-like entities too, or when humans augment their perception, consciousness and physical power through genetic engineering, drugs, or software and mechanical prostheses? Suppose we are destined to remake ourselves in the image of our ancient gods. Will it be through the embodiment of technologies in the physical reality, or through the complete disembodiment of our minds inside virtual worlds? (shrink)

Throughout the debate on psi, skeptics have almost universally insisted on different standards for evaluating the evidence, claiming that psi represents a radical departure from our current scientific understanding. Thus, there is considerable ambiguity about what standard of evaluation psi must meet. Little attention has been paid to the possible harm to the integrity of scientific investigation from this resulting inconsistency in testing standards. Some have proposed using a Bayesian framework as an improvement on this dilemma in order to more (...) explicitly model beliefs, assumptions, and background scientific knowledge, especially when evaluating a controversial hypothesis. Recently, Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, which constrains scientific research within bound- aries believed to be most productive, has been incorporated into a Bayesian framework. Within this framework, I explore a likely paradigm or meta-theory used by skeptics that typically constrains research and makes it difficult for psi evidence to be accepted. It appears that such a paradigm would in many respects have difficulty accounting for consciousness, which is fundamental to an understanding of psi. I discuss why psi data are likely to play a key role in making progress in solving the problem of consciousness. Thus, applying different standards of evaluation to psi data is likely counterproductive. (shrink)